ジンテキ シホン ト コクサイ ボウエキ by ジョアン, ファ スン et al.
Osaka University
Title Human Capital and International Trade
Author(s)Chong, Fatt Seng
Citation
Issue Date
Text VersionETD
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/2502
DOI
Rights
Human Capital and International Trade
Ph.D. Dissertation
Fatt Seng CHONG
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
2007

Preface
This monograph is the result of my research on human capital and interna-
tional trade in Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University since 2000.
After several years of the research, I left for Shobi University as a full time
lecturer and have been keeping on studying the same subject.
The subject of human capital has been elaborated for many economic
scientists for decades. Jacob Mincer first used the term in the modern neo-
classical economic literature which is his pioneering article ”Investment in
Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution” in The Journal of Po-
litical Economy in 1958. A few years later, Mincer and Gary Becker of the
Chicago school applied the idea of ”human capital” in economics. In particu-
lar, Becker’s book entitled Human Capital, published in 1964, is remarkable.
The book has become a standard reference for many years especially in the
field of economics.
The term human capital can be defined in many ways. Arthur Cecil Pigou
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first discussed that investment in human capital is just like investment in
material capital in 1928. Human capital is also a means of production which
is similar to factories and machines which are physical means of production.
This is because one can invest in human capital via education and one’s
outpout depends partly on the rate of return on the human capital one owns.
However, unlike the investment in material capital, after the investment in
human capital one owns, he or she cannot transfer the additional endowment
of human capital to other individuals.
The endowment of human capital can be increased through many channels
such as education, training, experience, etc. In some way, human capital also
accumulates, for instance, working experience, as many studies have exam-
ined. On the other hand, there are also quite many studies assume that hu-
man capital depends only on education period, such as Findlay-Kierzkowski
(1983), which is the basic applied model in this monograph.
Many governments are trying to change their education policy. More
human capital is reallocated into the education sector to increase the endow-
ment of professional human capital. In the framework of Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, if human capital is used in an industry intensively, then
the output of the good produced in the industry increases and tends to be
exported. On the other hand, in the framework of Ricardo-Viner model,
if human capital is used only in an industry, then the output of the good
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produced in the industry increases and tends to be exported. In either case,
human capital is used intensively or solely in an industry, the industry tends
to be a high-tech sector such as information technology (IT) sector.
Although there are some governments in Asian countries have succeeded
in their policy, but there are also quite a few countries has failed. Instead
of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, Ricardo-Viner model will be applied
to study not only on this issue but also on the issues of brain drain and
technology change throughout this monograph. Besides human capital, there
are still more than two kinds of factor appear in our study, namely, physical
capital and unskilled labor. In the part II of this monograph, which deals
with the issue of technology change and wage inequality, two kinds of human
capital, namely, skilled labor in sector 1 and skilled labor in sector 2, and
unskilled labor which is mobile between sectors will appear in our model.
In the context of international trade, human capital and brain drain relate
to each other. This subject is often argued in the study of migration or
mobility between nations in the international trade literature. Brain drain is
some time regarded as human capital flight. Just like capital flight, in which
the owner of the capital or financial capital invests in the other country
rather than the country he or she lives. What is the difference between brain
drain an capital flight? As I have argued before, one cannot transfer the
human capital he or she owns to other individuals, hence the transfer of
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human capital from a country to another country involves the migration of
the owner of human capital.
In many cases, when a country exports high-tech good, for example,
Japan exports high-tech good to china or India, human capital flight will
occur if mobility of human capital between nations is allowed. In fact, skilled
labor who owns the human capital which is used to produce the high-tech
good, tends to migrate to Japan from the countries which import the high-
tech good. However, this cannot be explained in the traditional Ricardo-
Viner model, since the traditional results in the standard model shows that
a country with more human capital which is specific to a sector tends to
export to a country with less human capital, while the factor price for the
human capital is lower than the country with less human capital. If this is
true, then skilled labor will not migrate to the country which exports the
high-tech good because the reward for human capital is lower.
Human capital and technology change also relates to each other. The issue
of human capital involves also the issue on wage inequality. Undoubtedly, the
issue of the relationship between technology change and wage inequality is
also important in the international trade context. The concept of formation
of human capital in this monograph will also be applied to study on this
issue.
Before I start talking about my study on the issues above in detailed, I
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wish to mention how much human capital I have acquired from during the
time I was preparing the manuscript. I discussed my ideas with numerous
colleagues and friends. They have contributed to this study with their valu-
able remarks, suggestions, and critique. Three of them, I am in particularly
indebted. The first one is my Ph.D. advisor, Professor Kenzo Abe, who
stimulated my interest in issues of human capital and international trade re-
lationships. His constant encouragement, valuable critique and appropriate
suggestions led to the completion of my dissertation. I also have an excep-
tional debt to Professor Suezo Ishizawa and Yasuji Goto. They spared so
much valuable time to guide me to go to graduate school when I was still an
undergraduate student in Tezukayama University.
I am also indebted to Professor Yutaka Horiba, who gave me so much
valuable comments and suggestions which led to significant improvements
on my study.
I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Professor Masao Oda,
Toru Kikuchi when I presented my paper for Japanese Economic Association.
I am also grateful for the valuable comments from Professor Masayuki Okawa,
Hisayuki Okamoto and Kazuhiro Igawa when I presented my paper for The
Japan Society of International Economics.
I wish to express my gratitude to the participants in seminars at Osaka
University, Professor Hidefumi Kasuga, Takumi Naito, Yasuhiro Takarada,
vii
Shuichi Akiyama, Kenji Gasawa, Yasuyuki Sugiyama and Muneyuki Saito,
who gave me a lot of helpful comments when I was still an graduate student
in Osaka University.
I am very grateful to Professor Makoto Mori, Takashi Ochiai, Nobuhiro
Takahashi and Naonori Koyama, who gave me so much helpful comments
and suggestions on my study when I made my presentation in seminars at
Osaka City University.
I greatly appreciate having the opportunity to give a presentation of my
study in Tezukayama University when I was a lecturer there. So many use-
ful comments and suggestions from Professor Hisashi Ikeda, Tetsu Iwane,
Kazuyasu Shigemoto, Koichi Nakajima, Yasuhiro Ueshima are much appre-
ciated.
Professor Fukashi Horie, Naomi Maruo, Tadahisa Higashi, Tetsuo Ihara,
Sueo Kamijo, Takeo Iguchi, Ohashi Toyohiko, Shohei Umezawa, Keisuke
Ohki, Masayuki Suzuki, Takenori Horimoto, Koujitu Sai, Keiko Irako, Takashi
Nishijima, Kazuyoshi Abe, Kei Horinouchi, Akihiro Yasu, Eiji Mashita, Masahide
Kobayashi, Takahiro Sugita, Nobuhiko Yamanaka, Akiko Okamatsu, who are
the participants in seminars at Shobi University, have taken constant interest
in my work, I owe many searching helpful comments to them.
In spite of all this help and advice, all errors, shortcomings, misconcep-
tions and typos that have remained in the manuscript, are my own respon-
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sibility.
The research grant from Shobi University is much appreciated which en-
abled me to participate in many academic discourse on workshops, confer-
ences and extramural seminars, and the publication of this monograph. Last
but not least, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Japanese
Government (Monbukagakusho: MEXT) Scholarship which was a great help
when I was a graduate student in Osaka University.
Finally I wish to mention the support from my family. Mio, my wife who
allowed my Ph.D. program for several years inspite of our burden on house-
hold finance. Moi and Yuen Fong, my parents who are getting old, allowed
my study in Japan for more than fifteen years, and have been desperately
anxious for my return home. Most of the work on this monograph and Ph.D.
program in Osaka University were borne by them. Without their patience,
I could not have time and comtemplation to elaborate my ideas which is
indispensable in my Ph.D. program and the completion of this monograph.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, workplace and work force have changed dramat-
ically. Since the world has changed to an information economy, people are
the critical asset. Many outputs are intangible and human capital becomes
a source of competitive advantage.
Human capital has become more critical to competitiveness. Many gov-
ernments have taken notice of this and recognized the necessity to increase
the endowment of human capital. Most governments are trying to change
their education policy in order to enhance the competitiveness of the in-
dustry using human capital to produce high-tech good. This kind of policy
brings about the issues of trade pattern, change in wages, brain drain and so
on. Our study examines these issues in part I which includes chapter 2 and
chapter 3.
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In chapter 2, we examine the Ricardo-Viner (RV) trade model which
incorporates an intermediate good under public service. We allow the gov-
ernment to use one of the sector-specific factors and the general factor to
produce the sector-specific factor that has been used by the government.
Hence from this chapter the intermediate good serves as input for both the
public sector and the private sector. We will see some very similar results as
those of the standard RV model. However, we will also show the effects of
the public service on trade patterns and factor prices. The examination in
this chapter is based on Chong (2002b).
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between trade patterns and brain
drain with publicly provided education service which controls human capital
formation. We apply RV model to show that when human capital mobility
is allowed in a free trade world, brain drain does not occur necessarily in a
country which exports the good using human capital.
The issue on relationship between technology change and wage inequality
has been argued in many studies. In particular, United States has been
experiencing the increase in income inequality due to the technical change.
Many economists have argued that the rising income inequality is due to the
skilled labor biased technical change. But this is not necessarily true.
In chapter 4, we construct a RV model with endogenous labor supplies and
examine the effects of two types of technical change on relative wages. That
2
is, (i) product-specific skilled labor augmentation and (ii) product-specific
unskilled labor augmentation. We will clarify whether factor bias or sector
bias matters for relative wages. Within this framework, there is also an ad-
ditional indirect effect through the labor market compared to the traditional
RV model. We will also show that the indirect effect is unambiguous in case
(i) and ambiguous in case (ii). Both cases establish the validity of the ear-
lier results in the traditional RV model, although it brings some additional
results for individual wages in case (ii). The examination in this chapter is
based on Chong (2002a).
A summary and some remarks are given in the last chapter.
3

Part I
Brain Drain and Trade Pattern
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Chapter 2
The Ricardo-Viner Model with
a Publicly Provided
Intermediate Good
2.1 Introduction
There have been so many studies of examining the basic results of Ricardo-
Viner (RV) model as well as Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model by
reconstructing the conventional version of those models. For example, the
assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) is replaced by variable returns
to scale (VRS) [e.g., Kemp and Negishi (1970), Helpman (1983,1984)]. On
the other hand, the inelasticities of the factor supplies become elastic which
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can be done by incorporating intermediate goods into the production func-
tions of the final goods. Most studies serve intermediate good as input of the
final good solely. Some studies even deal with the presence of VRS in the
production of intermediate goods [e.g., Ishikawa (1991) and Isikawa (1992)].
However, intermediate goods are not necessarily produced by the private sec-
tor, some studies show examples incorporating a government-financed public
input which is simultaneously used by two industries [e.g., Tawada and Abe
(1984), Ishizawa (1988)].
In this chapter, we allow the assumptions of CRS remain in all sectors,
but serve intermediate good as input not only for a final good, but also
for intermediate good itself. In the meantime, we concentrate on RV model
rather than HOS model. Ishikawa (2000) constructs a RV model by replacing
one of the sector-specific factors with a sector-specific intermediate good. In
his study, there are two primary factors, two final goods, and one intermediate
good. One of the factors is sector-specific and the other is general. The
intermediate good is also specific to the sector where the specific factor is
not used. Our model here is very similar to the model in Ishikawa (2000),
however, the intermediate good in his model is produced with the general
factor alone and served as private good. Our model will differ from his basic
model in these two points.
It is possible to consider the general factor as labor (unskilled labor), the
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specific factor as land or plant, etc, and the intermediate good as human
capital (skilled labor), in which case the model could be used to analyze
an economy with a sector particularly using human capital such as software
industry while the other sector particularly using land or machine such as
food industry. In the sence of human capital, the public service can be
considered as education and is the only channel through which human capital
accumulates. We will construct an overlapping-generations model as what
Findlay-Kierzkowski (1983) and Wong-Yip (1999) study, where the former
consider T-genereation while the latter consider only 2-generation in each
period.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Basic Ricardo-Viner Model with
Intermediate Good
We consider a three-sector (2 private sectors and 1 public sector), two-
primary-factor (unskilled labor and capital) framework. Private sectors pro-
duce final goods, good 1 and good 2, while public sector produces an in-
termediate good, say, human capital. Capital is specific to sector 2, while
unskilled labor is general factor and freely moves across private sectors. The
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basic RV model in this chapter is expressed as
X1 = X1(Hp, L1), (2.1)
X2 = X2(K,L2), (2.2)
L1 + L2 = L, (2.3a)
L = L(Ul), (2.3b)
Hp = H −He, (2.4a)
H = F (He, Ue), (2.4b)
K = K¯, (2.5)
where Ul, Ue, Xi, Li (i=1,2), L, K, K¯, H, Hp, and He are, respectively,
uneducated individual in the unskilled labor market, uneducated individual
in the public sector, the output of sector i, the general factor (unskilled labor)
hired by sector i, the general factor supply, factor(capital) specific to sector 1
which is used, its total endowment, gross output of intermediate good (human
capital or skilled labor), net output of intermediate good which is specific to
sector 2 and that serve as input in public sector. Equations (3.1), (3.1),
(2.3a), (2.4a) and (3.5) are, respectively, the production functions of good
1 and good 2, full employment conditions of unskilled labor, human capital
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(skilled labor) and capital. Equation (2.3b) is the unskilled labor supply
function while equation (2.4b) is the production function of the intermediate
good (human capital) in public sector. Note that except the equations (2.3b)
and (2.4b), the system above is very similar to that in the traditional RV
model1. Good 2 is produced using unskilled labor and capital, while good 1
is produced using unskilled labor and the human capital. The human capital
is produced using uneducated individual and human capital2, hence it serves
as an input in the public sector as well as in the sector 1. Xi(·) (i=1,2)
and F (·) are increasing, strictly quasi-concave, positively linear homogeneous
and twice continuously differentiable. We will explain in an explicit way for
Li(·) in the next subsection. Full employment and perfect competition are
assumed.
2.2.2 Human Capital Formation
Let us consider an economy which N individuals are ‘born’ at each period
and are uneducated in the beginning, each of them lives for 2 periods. The
population of the economy at each period is 2N .
1Since we will treat He as an exogenous variable, it is exactly same as the traditional
RV model. See also Jones (1971).
2When the uneducated individual and the human capital are used in public sector, they
should be refered as ‘student’ and ‘educator’
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Government provide a public service for those who want to be educated
under the public service for free but forgoing the opportunity to participate
in the unskilled labor market during the education period (the 1st period of
his lifetime). We can see from above, there are two kinds of decision maker
among the new generation in each period. Let Ue denote those who decide
to earn their income under wage rate (WH) as a skilled labor after having
enjoyed the public service. Those who decide not to enjoy the public service
and participate in the unskilled labor market to earn their income under
wage rate (WL) is denoted by Ul. The population is expressed as
2N = 2(Ue + Ul),
which can be rewritten as
N = Ue + Ul, (2.6)
Noting that the production function of the human capital is positively
linear homogeneous, equation (2.4b) can be rewritten as
H
Ue
= h = f(he),
f(0) > 0 f
′
> 0 f
′′
i < 0 he =
He
Ue
,
where h and he are, respectively, human capital per capita acquired by Ue
and educator-student ratio3.
3Compare to Becker and Murphy (1992), which shows that the human capital acquired
12
For simplicity, we also assume that the domestic capital stock is owned
by all the individuals and there is perfectly equality in distribution of the
capital stock4. Then, in each period, each individual receives rk equally,
where k = K/2N and r is the factor price of the capital. An additional
income as WL will be earned in period 1 and period 2 if he of she becomes
unskilled labor, while WH ·f(he) is earned only in period 2 if he or she decides
to acquire the human capital through the public service. The lifetime income
of Ul and Ue at present value are, respectively, can be expressed as
Bl = (1− τ)[WL + rk + (WL + rk) · 1
1 + ρ
]
Be = (1− τ){rk + [WHf(he) + rk] · 1
1 + ρ
}.
ρ and τ are, respectively, fixed interest rate and income tax rate imposed by
government to finance the public service.
Since dBe/dUe < 0, we know that Ue must be determined under the
arbitrary condition as
Bl = Be,
which yields
f(he) =
WL
WH
·R, (2.7)
by a student depends on the human capital of her teachers, and the number of teachers
per student.
4Many studies assume this, for example, see Gupta (1994).
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Oh
WL/WH
f(he)
R
(WL
WH
)′(WLWH )
∗(he)∗(he)′he
Figure 2.1: Determination of Ue given He, R and N as well as WL/WH , where he and
h can be considered as the level of educator per student and the level of quality or human
captital per student, respectively.
where R ≡ 2 + ρ is assumed to be fixed, further , we define WL/WH as
relative wage in this chapter. Given He and WL/WH as well as R and N , Ue
is determined as shown in figure 2.1.
Ul is determined in equation (2.6). It follows that equation (2.3b) deter-
mines L, and equations (2.4a) and (2.4b) determine Hp. Since each individual
lives for 2 periods, we can rewrite the equation (2.3b) into an explicit form
as
L = 2Ul. (2.8)
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Equation (2.4a) and (2.4b) can also be rewritten as
Hp = f(he) · Ue −He. (2.9)
We also assume that the cost of the public service is financed by the
government by equal income tax rate among all individuals5, then the gov-
ernment budget constraint is expressed as
WHHe = τ [WH(Hp + He) + WLL]. (2.10)
Equation (2.10) will be used to solve for τ alone.
In general, a whole system has to be solved simultaneously including the
determination of WL/WH . Let us use the dual unit cost functions to rewrite
the basic RV model. The unit cost functions are expressed as
C1(WL,WH) = P1, (2.11a)
C2(WL, r) = 1, (2.11b)
where good 2 is numeraire good. The full employment conditions are ex-
pressed as
C1WH (WL,WH)X1 = Hp, (2.12a)
C2r (WL, r)X2 = K, (2.12b)
C1WL(WL,WH)X1 + C
2
WL
(WL, r)X2 = L, (2.12c)
5See Abe (1990).
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where the subscripts on each function represent the partial derivative of
the function with respect to the corresponding variable; that is C1WH ≡
∂C1/∂WH
6.
Thus, we have 10 equations from (2.6) to (2.12c) and 10 unknowns (Ue, Ul, Hp,
L,WL,WH , r,X1, X2, τ) with given variables, P , He, N and ρ. We call the
economy above as public intermediate good economy.
2.3 Preliminaries
Before we go for the comparative static analysis, we can rearrange the equa-
tions above into the terms of rates of changes.
Uˆl = −γUˆe, (2.13)
Hˆe − Uˆe = (1 + β)(WˆL − WˆH), (2.14)
Lˆ = Uˆl, (2.15)
Hˆp =
1
λH
[
1
1 + β
(Hˆe − Uˆe) + Uˆe − (1− λH)Hˆe], (2.16)
θL1WˆL + θHWˆH = Pˆ1, (2.17a)
θL2WˆL + θrrˆ = 0, , (2.17b)
6By Shepard’s lemma, we should also further note that, for example, C1WH is the skilled
labor input coefficient of sector 1.
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Cˆ1WL(WL,WH) = −θHσ1(WˆL − WˆH), (2.17c)
Cˆ2WL(WL, r) = −θrσ2(WˆL − rˆ), (2.17d)
Cˆ1WH (WL,WH) = θL1σ1(WˆL − WˆH), (2.17e)
Cˆ2r (WL, r) = θL2σ2(WˆL − rˆ), (2.17f)
2∑
i=1
λLiXˆi = Lˆ−
2∑
i=1
λLiCˆ
i
WL
(·), (2.18a)
Xˆ1 = Hˆp − Cˆ1WH (WL,WH), (2.18b)
Xˆ2 = Kˆ − Cˆ2r (WL, r), (2.18c)
where
γ ≡ Ue
Ul
,
λH ≡ Hp
Hp + He
, 0 < λH < 1,
β ≡ 1− σ
q
σq
> 0,
σq ≡ f
′(he)
f(he)
· he, 0 < σq < 1,
θLi ≡
WLC
i
WL
(·)
Pi
, for i = 1, 2,
θH ≡
WHC
1
WH
(·)
P1
, θL1 + θH = 1,
θr ≡ rC
2
r (·)
P2
, θL2 + θr = 1,
σ1 ≡
Cˆ1WH (·)− Cˆ1WL(·)
WˆL − WˆH
> 0,
σ2 ≡
Cˆ2r (·)− Cˆ2WL(·)
WˆL − rˆ
> 0,
λLi ≡
CiWL(·)Xi
L
, for i = 1, 2, λL1 + λL2 = 1.
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(ˆ) denotes a proportionate change, for example, Hˆp = dHp/Hp. σ
q is pos-
itive and smaller than 1 since we have assumed f ′′(·) < 0. The equations
(2.13)-(2.18c) can be obtained by differentiating equations (2.6)-(2.9) and
equations (2.11a)-(2.12c). That is, equations (2.13)-(2.16) are from equa-
tions (2.6)-(2.9), equations (2.17a)-(2.17f) are from equations (2.11a) and
(2.11b), and equations (2.18a)-(2.18c) are from equations (2.12a)-(2.12c). σq
represents the change in percentage of the human capital acquired per capita
due to the change of one percent in educator-student ratio. θLi, θH and
θr, are the familiar income shares in HOS model or RV model. σi and λLi
are, respectively, the substitution elasticity between factors and fraction of
unskilled labor in ith sector.
Equations (2.17a)-(2.18c) represent exactly the equations those in the
standard RV model. The traditional solutions for WˆL and Xˆi (i=1,2) are
expressed as
WˆL =
1
Λe
(Λe1Pˆ1 + λL1Hˆp + λL2Kˆ − Lˆ) (2.19)
Xˆ1 = θL1eL1 · Λ
e
2
Λe
· Pˆ1 + Hˆp
+
θL1eL1
Λe
(Lˆ− λL1Hˆp − λL2Kˆ) (2.20a)
Xˆ2 = −θL2eL2 · Λ
e
1
Λe
· Pˆ1 + Kˆ
+
θL2eL2
Λe
(Lˆ− λL1Hˆp − λL2Kˆ). (2.20b)
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where
Λei ≡ λLieLi, for i = 1, 2, Λe1 + Λe2 = Λe,
eL1 ≡ σ1
θH
, eL2 ≡ σ2
θr
.
eLi and Λ
e are, respectively, the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor in
the ith sector and the aggregate general-equilibrium elasticity of demand for
unskilled labor in the private sectors.
2.4 Comparative Statics
In the standard RV model, Hˆp and Lˆ are treated as exogenous variables,
but in this chapter, since they are treated as endogenous variables, more
equations are necessary to complete our story.
Rewrite equations (2.17a) and (2.17b) as
WˆL − WˆH = WˆL − Pˆ1
θH
, (2.17a′)
WˆL − rˆ = WˆL
θr
, (2.17b′)
and substitute equation (2.17a′) into equation (2.14), we have
Hˆe − Uˆe = (1 + β)(WˆL − Pˆ1
θH
). (2.14′)
Substitute equation (2.13) into equation (2.15), we have
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Lˆ = −γUˆe. (2.15′)
Solving equations (2.14′), (2.15′), (2.16) and (2.19) simultaneously, we obtain
WˆL, Hˆp, Lˆ and Uˆe as
WˆL =
1
Λe + β˜
[(Λe1 + β˜)Pˆ1 + (λL1 + γ)Hˆe + λL2Kˆ], (2.21)
Hˆp =
1
Λ˜
{[λHθHΛe + λHγ − (1− λH)γβ]Hˆe
+Λe2βPˆ1 − λL2βKˆ}, (2.22)
Uˆe =
1
Λ˜
{[λHθHΛe + (1− λH)λL1β − λHλL1]Hˆe
+λH(1 + β)Λ
e
2Pˆ1 − λH(1 + β)λL2Kˆ}, (2.23)
Lˆ =
γ
Λ˜
{[λHλL1 − λHθHΛe − (1− λH)λL1β]Hˆe
−λH(1 + β)Λe2Pˆ1 + λH(1 + β)λL2Kˆ}, (2.24)
where
β˜ ≡ (λL1 + λHγ)β + λHγ
λHθH
> 0,
Λ˜ ≡ λHθH(Λe + β˜) > 0.
2.4.1 Commodity Prices and Factor Prices
From equation (2.21), we can see that the effects of P1 and K on WL is
similar to that in the standard RV model, particularly the result where 0 <
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WˆL/Pˆ1 < 1
7. To see this, we can compare equations (2.19) and (2.21). Let
us define
Sˆ ≡ Lˆ− (λL1Hˆp + λL2Kˆ).
We call Sˆ as the proportionate change in the supply of unskilled labor relative
to an “aggregate” of the specific factors8. Substitute equations (2.22) and
(2.24) into Sˆ, we obtain
Sˆ = − Λ
e
2β˜
Λe + β˜
· Pˆ1 − Λ
e(λL1 + γ)
Λe + β˜
· Hˆe − Λ
eλL2
Λe + β˜
· Kˆ. (2.25)
Substitute equation (4.1) into equation (2.19), we have
WˆL =
1
Λe
(Λe1Pˆ1 − Sˆ),
or in an explicit form as
WˆL =
1
Λe
(Λe1Pˆ1 +
Λe2β˜
Λe + β˜
· Pˆ1 + Λ
e(λL1 + γ)
Λe + β˜
· Hˆe + Λ
eλL2
Λe + β˜
· Kˆ). (2.19′)
Holding Hˆe and Kˆ being fixed, we have decomposed the effect of P1 on
WL in more concrete way. In the right hand side, the first term in the bracket
relates to the conventional direct effect as in the standard RV model, while
7Note further that, this eventually implies also that WˆH < Pˆ1 < WˆL < Pˆ2 = 0 < rˆ
which is the familiar one in the standard RV model.
8See Bhagwati and Jagdish (c1983)
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the second term relates to the indirect effect through the change in factor
supply (Hp and L) due to the change in relative wage (WL/WH) which is
caused by the change in relative price of final goods (P1). Further, because
it is true that
1
Λe
(Λe1 +
Λe2β˜
Λe + β˜
) =
Λe1 + β˜
Λe + β˜
< 1,
since Λe1 < Λ
e. Hence we have
WˆL < Pˆ1.
From equations (2.17a′) and (2.17b′), it is easy to see that
WˆL − WˆH < 0, WˆL − rˆ > 0.
Let us make a clear distinction between WˆL and Wˆ
′
L where
Wˆ ′L =
Λe1
Λe
· Pˆ1.
(′) represents the conventional direct effects in the standard RV model. Sim-
ilarly, we can also define Wˆ ′H and rˆ′ in the same sense. Hence we have,
WˆL > Wˆ
′
L,
and from equations (2.17a′) and (2.17b′), we also have
Wˆ ′H > WˆH , rˆ′ > rˆ,
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which yields
Wˆ ′H > WˆH > Pˆ1 > WˆL > Wˆ ′L > Pˆ2 = 0 > rˆ′ > rˆ.
Let us conclude the argument as below.
Proposition 2.1
In the public intermediate good economy, the theory of standard RV model
remains valid, that is WˆH > Pˆ1 > WˆL > Pˆ2 = 0 > rˆ. However, the mobile
factor gains more, while the immobile factors gain less (lose more) than that
in the standard RV model.
This is not surprising. In the standard RV model, Sˆ/Pˆ1 = 0, but in this
chapter, from equation (2.25), we know that Sˆ/Pˆ1 < 0. This can be seen
in more obvious way in equations (2.23) and (2.24), that is, an increase in
P1 raises Ue and reduces L, causing the supply of unskilled labor relative to
an “aggregate” of the specific factors decrease, hence there is an additional
positive indirect effect for the mobile factor and negative indirect effects for
the specific factors.
2.4.2 Change in Human Capital
In this subsection, we examine the change in human capital or skilled labor.
This examination is essential for clarifying the effect on final good output
as shown in equations (2.20a) and (2.20b). From the equation (2.22), we
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know that an increase in P1 raises Hp. On the other hand, an increase in
K reduces Hp. This can be predicted easily from the proposition 2.1, that
is, an increase in P1 (K) reduces (raises) relative wage, it follows that from
equations (2.14) and (2.16), we know that Hp increases (decreases) due to
the increase (decrease) in Ue. However, the effect of He is a bit complicated
here. From equation (2.21), we can see that the sign depends mainly on β
which can be 0 or infinitively large if σq is 1 or 0. Let us rewrite the equation
(2.16) as
Hˆp = HˆA + HˆB + HˆC , (2.16
′)
where
HˆA ≡ 1
λH(1 + β)
(Hˆe − Uˆe),
HˆB ≡ 1
λH
· Uˆe,
HˆC ≡ −1− λH
λH
· Hˆe < 0.
HˆA, HˆB and HˆC are, respectively, the effect which positively depends educator-
student ratio, the effect which positively depends on number of students and
the negative input effect. We call HˆA, HˆB and HˆC as, respectively, quality
effect, quantity effect and input effect. Let us first conclude from equation
(2.16′) as below.
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Lemma 2.1 In the public intermediate good economy, the effect on the net
output of human capital is decomposed into three parts which are called quality
effect, quantity effect and input effect.
There are many studies show that quality effect depends on positively on
educator-student ratio9. From equation (2.23), we know that an increase
in He may increase or decrease Ue hence the quantity effect is ambiguous.
One may argue that in the case that Ue increases, an increase in He may
even reduce the educator-student ratio, then the quality effect should also be
ambiguous. But this is not right, since we have examined that (WˆL−WˆH)/Hˆe
is positive10, from equation (2.14) we know that an increase in He must raise
the educator-student ratio. To see this in an explicit way, substitute equation
(2.21) into equation (2.14′) and into equation (2.16′), we have
HˆA =
1
Λ˜
[(λL1 + γ)Hˆe − Λe2Pˆ1 + λL2Kˆ],
HˆB =
1
Λ˜
{[θH(Λe + β˜)− (1 + β)(λL1 + γ)]Hˆe
+(1 + β)Λe2Pˆ1 − (1 + β)λL2Kˆ}.
9Becker and Murphy (1992) also note that some good empirical studies like Card and
Krueger (1990) and Finn and Achilles (1990) found some evidence to the assumption
above.
10See equations (2.21) and (2.17a′).
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At present moment, let Pˆ1 and Kˆ be 0 and sum up the quality effect and the
quantity effect, we obtain
HˆA + HˆB =
1
Λ˜
{θHΛe + γ + 1
λH
[(1− λH)λL1β]} > 0.
Further, since HˆC < 0, the total effect must be ambiguous. Recall the
equation (2.22), its sign can be expressed as
Hˆp
Hˆe
>
=
<
0 if λH
>
=
<
ηH .
where ηH ≡ γβ
γβ + γ + θHΛe
. Note that ηH and λH are smaller than 1. Let
us conclude the argument above as
Lemma 2.2 (a). λH > ηH if σ
q or/and Λe is/are significantly large.
(b). λH < ηH if both σ
q and Λe are significantly small.
Further, we can establish the proposition as below.
Proposition 2.2
In the public intermediate good economy, the supply of human capital in-
creases (decreases), if there is
(a). an increase (decrease) in relative price of commodity where human
capital is used to produce that commodity, or/and
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(b). an decrease (increase) in capital, or/and
(c). an increase in provision of public service if λH > (<)ηH .
The effects of P1 and K are obvious since an increase in P1 and decrease in
K reduce WL/WH , this makes more individual become students, that is, Ue
increases hence the quantity effect is positive. On the other hand, the quality
effect becomes negative, but this will be dominated by the positive quantity
effect as shown in equation (2.16′). The effect of an increase in provision says
that there is an maximum point for the supply of human capital, this implies
that if He is so large, hence λH < ηH , an decrease in the provision of public
service can increase the supply of human capital.
2.4.3 Change in Outputs of Final Goods
In this subsection we will examine the effect on outputs of final goods before
we examine the trade pattern in the next section. Substitute equations (2.22)
and (4.1) into equation (2.20a), and equation (4.1) into equation (2.20b), we
obtain
Xˆ1 =
1
Λ˜
{Λe2β¨Pˆ1 + [λH(γβ + γ + Λ˜e)− γβ]Hˆe − λL2β¨Kˆ}, (2.20a′)
Xˆ2 = − θL2eL2
Λe + β˜
[(Λe1 + β˜)Pˆ1 + (λL1 + γ)Hˆe] +
Λ¨e + β˜
Λe + β˜
· Kˆ, (2.20b′)
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where
β¨ ≡ λHθHθL1eL1 + β > 0,
Λ˜e ≡ θH{[(1− θL1)λL1 − θL1γ]eL1 + Λe2},
Λ¨e ≡ Λe1 + (1− θL2)Λe2 + β˜ < Λe.
Define X ≡ X1/X2 as relative output of commodity 1. From equation
(2.20a′) and (2.20b′) we have
Lemma 2.3 In the public intermediate good economy, an increase (decrease)
in P1 (K) raises X1 but reduces X2, hence we have Xˆ/Pˆ1 > 0 and Xˆ/Kˆ < 0.
An increase in He reduces X2, whereas the effect on X1 is ambiguous hence
Xˆ/Hˆe remains ambiguous as well.
Let P1 and K be fixed, we have
Xˆ
Hˆe
=
λH(γβ + γ + Λ¯
e)− γβ
Λ˜
, (2.26)
where Λ¯e ≡ θH [Λe + (λL1 + γ)(θL2eL2 − θL1eL1)].
Note that Λ˜e and Λ¯e may be negative if θL1 and eL1 are so large, for
simplicity, let us assume that
Assumption 2.1
θL1 is sufficiently small so that Λ˜
e and Λ¯e are positive.
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From equations (2.20a′) and (2.26) we know that
Xˆ1
Hˆe
>
=
<
0 if λH
>
=
<
ηX1,
Xˆ
Hˆe
>
=
<
0 if λH
>
=
<
ηX ,
where
ηX1 ≡
γβ
γβ + γ + Λ˜e
, ηX ≡ γβ
γβ + γ + Λ¯e
.
This is very similar to the argument in the lemma 2.2. Thus we can conclude
that
Lemma 2.4 Let assumption 2.1 be satisfied, then
(a). λH > ηX1 and λH > ηX are true if σ
q or/and Λe is significantly large.
(b). λH < ηX1 and λH < ηX are true if both σ
q and Λe are significantly
small11.
Then we can establish the proposition as below.
11Since assumption 2.1 is satisfied, the change in Λe corresponds to the change in both
Λ˜e and Λ¯e.
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Proposition 2.3
Let assumption 2.1 be satisfied, then, in the public intermediate good econ-
omy, an increase in provision of public service raises (reduces) the relative
supply of commodity 1 as well as its output if σq or/and (and) Λe is (are)
significantly large (small).
This relates to the proposition 2.2, once we know the effect on Hp, we can
predict what would happen according to the results in standard RV model.
2.5 Trade Pattern
In this section, we examine the trade pattern by assuming two countries in
the world.
To see how the relative price of commodities changes, the demand side of
commodities has to be stated explicitly. We can express the relative demand
D as a function of relative price of the commodities P1 on the demand side,
if we assume homothetic preferences , then the domestic market equilibrium
is expressed as
X = D(P1).
Differentiating the equation above and consider the sign of Xˆ/Pˆ1 and Xˆ/Hˆe
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which have been examined, we have12
Pˆ1
Hˆe
= −( Xˆ
Pˆ1
+ σD)
−1 · Xˆ
Hˆe
, (2.27)
where σD ≡ −D′(P1)P1/D(P1) > 0 is the price elasticity of demand. Since
Xˆ/Pˆ1 > 0, the sign of Pˆ1/Hˆe depends solely on Xˆ/Hˆe. Hence we will have
the same argument again as in the proposition 2.3 as
Proposition 2.4
Suppose that there are two countries with the public intermediate good econ-
omy, where
(a). preferences, technology and population are identical,
(b). the share of the unskilled labor in the cost of producing commodity 1
is sufficiently small, that is θL1 is sufficiently close to 0.
Then, the country allocate more (less) skilled labor into the public sector
tends to be skilled labor abundant country, hence exports commodity 1 and
imports commodity 2 if σq or/and (and) Λe is (are) significantly large (small).
The proposition implies that, for example, consider a government intends to
enhance the competitiveness of a selective sector which uses human capital
through the public service to develop and support the formation of human
capital. If the effect on the quality per student is so small under the public
12See appendix in this chapter.
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service, the fraction of the skilled labor allocated into the public sector may
be too large hence the government’s policy may bring the result which is
opposite to the target13.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined how the difference in allocation of human capital
and effect of the provision of the public service on the formation of human
capital determine the change in labor supply. In particular, we have examined
the formation of the skilled labor which can be decomposed into quality effect,
quantity effect and input effect. The results then immediately tell us whether
the private sectors expand or not as in the conventional results shown in the
standard RV model. One of the most important point is that whether the
effect on the quality per student is so small under the public service, this
effect will affect the entire effectiveness of the skilled labor supply in the
sector. If it is possible to have such case, all the private sectors in the public
intermediate good economy will shrink, and the GNP in the country may
fall as well although we have ignored the definition and the examination
of welfare throughout this chapter. Another viewpoint of this chapter is,
if brain drain occurs in the selective private sector, the fraction of the total
13Compare to the proposition 1 in Abe (1990).
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skilled labor for the public sector will become larger than before. As a result,
if the government reallocates additional skilled labor from the private sector
into the public sector may aggravate the economy of the country, otherwise
continue to increase the public service will enhance the competitiveness of
the selective industry but gradually reach to the maximum point and turn
to deteriorate. We should also point out that an endogenous provision of
the public service model may be more appropriate. Further, the reason for
government to enhance a selective sector should be incorporated into the
model. What we have presented here are the basic framework for the future
research.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we will show how we obtain the equation (2.27). Since we
know X is a function of P1 and He, while D is a function of P1, and the
domestic market equilibrium which can be expressed as
X(P1, He) = D(P1). (A.1)
P1 is determined in equation (A.1) as a function of He, which can be
expressed as
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P1 = P
∗
1 (He). (A.2)
Equation (A.1) becomes an identity if we substitute equation (A.2) into
equation (A.1), which can be expressed as
X(P ∗1 (He), He) = D(P
∗
1 (He)). (A.3)
Differentiating equation (A.3), we obtain
∂P ∗1
∂He
= −( ∂X
∂P1
− ∂D
∂P1
)−1 · ∂X
∂He
, (A.4)
which can be rewritten as equation (2.27).
Notice also that the first term and the second term in the bracket of RHS
are positive, hence we know that the sign of ∂P ∗1 /∂He is negative if ∂X/∂He
is positive. However, the sign of ∂X/∂He is ambiguous in this model.
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Chapter 3
Trade Patterns and Brain
Drain with Public Human
Capital Formation
3.1 Introduction
It is widely known that skilled workers tend to migrate from developing
countries to advanced industrial nations1. Developed countries usually have
the comparative advantage in the production of high-tech good using skilled
workers, in the meantime, skilled workers also get higher wage compared to
1See, for example, a 1984 report (July 20) by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD).
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developing countries. This also implies that skilled workers prefer to migrate
to developed countries as long as they prefer higher wage. However, this
violates the basic propositions in the frame work of RV model, i.e., a country
with larger supply of skilled workers which are specific to hich-tech sector, has
the comparative advantage in the production of the good, but lower factor
price for skilled workers.
This chapter incorporates public human capital formation into the basic
model of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) to provide an explanation of the
issue above. They construct a model with two kinds of individual with equal
lifetime incomes in terms of present value which is based on the standard HOS
Model 2. They show the additional effects of the change in prices compared to
the conventional model. In their model, publicly provided education service
does not exit and the education cost is fully financed by the students 3.
2Mayer (1982), shows factor quality considerations into Heckscher-Ohlin framework and
examines the importance of factors skills in determining a country’s production pattern
and income distribution, while Mayer (1991) shows also the impacts of world price, capital
endowment on labor supply, output and national income.
3Although there is a trend that many universities start charging tuition to the students
in many countries, but the role of publicly provided education service is still significant
nowadays. In order to make our results more clearly, we focus only on the role of publicly
provided education and assume that privately provided education does not exit, which is
crucially different from Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983).
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In this chapter, there are three kinds of factors, that is, capital, unskilled
workers and skilled workers which are refered as human capital. However,
the human capital is assumed to be produced by government through public
service in our model. Government can reallocate more human capital into
the public sector by extracting human capital 4 from the private sector.
This chapter shows that the supply of human capital does not necessarily
increase even if government employs more educators for public sector. On
the issue between international trade and brain drain5 , this chapter also
shows that even if a country exports a good using human capital which is
specific factor, the factor price for the human capital in the country can still
be higher than that in the foreign. As a result, the human capital flows from
the foreign into the country. This result is opposite from the traditional
RV model, which does not help to explain the relationship between trade
patterns and factor mobility in most cases for many countries.
Miyagiwa (1991) and Wong and Yip (1999), emphasize the role of in-
creasing returns to scale in education and overlapping-generations model of
endogenous growth, respectively. Compared to their studies, this chapter
presents only a very simple model following the basic assumptions such as
4In this case, educators in universities are referred as human capital.
5Some recent studies on brain drain are remarkable, e.g., see Mullan (2005) and Horvat
(2005).
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constant returns to scale in education and perfect competition in private sec-
tors, but still provide some explanations for the issue of human capital mo-
bility between advanced industrial countries and developing countries. Other
than that, this chapter also examines whether a government can enhance the
competitiveness of high-tech sector by hiring more educators.
The model is presented in the next section. The effects of public service
are examined in section 3. Our propostion about the trade patterns is ob-
tained in section 4. Section 5 discuss the issue of brain drain. Some remarks
on our conclusion appear in the final section.
3.2 The Model
We introduce a country with public human capital formation. There are
two private and one public sectors in the country, where one of the pri-
vate sectors produces high-tech final good using human capital and unskilled
workers, while the other private sector produces low-tech final good using
physical capital and unskilled workers6. Unskilled workers is mobile between
private sectors while human capital and physical capital are factor specific
to high-tech sector and low-tech sector, respectively. Public sector provides
education service to the students for free. We assume that only educators
6At the present moment, we implicitly assume a small open country model.
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are required for the education service. Therefore, the public sector produces
human capital using only educators and students7. For the time being, let us
show the standard RV model here. The production functions are expressed
as8
X1 = L
α
1H
1−α
p , 0 < α < 1,
X2 = L
β
2K
1−β, 0 < β < 1,
where X1, X2, L1, L2, Hp and K are high-tech final good produced in high-
tech sector (i.e., sector 1), low-tech final good produced in low-tech sector
(i.e., sector 2), unskilled workers employed in high-tech sector and low-tech
sector, human capital specific to high-tech sector and physical capital specific
to low-tech sector, respectively. Let WL, WH and r denote the factor prices
of unskilled workers, human capital and physical capital, respectively. Using
the unit cost functions9, the final goods market equilibrium conditions will
7Educators are also regarded as human capital. On the other hand, students themselves
also become the human capital after graduation.
8Cobb-Douglas functions will make our analysis become simpler. Moreover, we can
obtain sharper results easily compared to those general functions which will not make
significant difference.
9The unit cost functions are defined as
min
L1,Hp
{WLL1 + WHHp|Lα1H1−αp ≥ 1}, and
min
L2,K
{WLL2 + rK|Lβ2K1−β ≥ 1}.
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be given by
(WL
α
)α( WH
1− α
)1−α
= P, (3.1)
(WL
β
)β( r
1− β
)1−β
= 1, (3.2)
where low-tech good serves as the numeraire, and P is the relative price of
high-tech good in terms of the numeraire. Full employment conditions are
expressed as
( α
1− α ·
WH
WL
)1−α
X1 +
( β
1− β ·
r
WL
)1−β
X2 = L, (3.3)(1− α
α
· WL
WH
)α
X1 = Hp, (3.4)(1− β
β
· WL
r
)β
X2 = K. (3.5)
Given P , K, L, Hp, α and β, we can solve for WL, WH , r, X1 and X2 from
equations (3.1) to (3.5). This is only the familiar basic RV model10 which is
much simpler than what we are going to extend11.
At the present model, we only consider a small open country without
any international factor mobility. Human capital can be allocated into either
private sector (i.e., high-tech sector) or public sector which can be expressed
as
H = Hp + He, (3.6)
10See Jones (1971).
11L and Hp will be endogenously determined.
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where H and He denote the total supply of domestic human capital and the
supply of educators, respectively.
As in the traditional RV model, we assume the conditions of full employ-
ment and perfect competition are always satisfied in the country. However,
unskilled workers and human capital are treated as endogenous variables
in this chapter. We follow the basic concept of Findlay and Kierzkowski
(1983)12. N individuals are born and N individuals die in each period in the
economy, all live for T periods. This means that the population will always
be NT in the steady state13
We assume education service is publicly provided by government for in-
dividuals free of charge in the country, rather than privately provided as
assumed in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). Either individuals can be “un-
skilled workers” and immediately start earning WL for their whole life, or
they can become “students,” acquire an “education” that last for a fixed
length of time θ, and become “skilled workers,” earning WH for the fixed
length of time (T − θ). Thus, for each generation,
N = Ul + Ue (3.7)
12The pioneering contribution of Kemp and Jones (1962) and elaboration by Frenkel and
Razin (1975), Martin (1976) and Martin and Neary (1980) in the literature on variable
labor supply are also remarkable.
13There are T generations and each generation has N individuals.
41
must be satisfied, where Ul and Ue donote the individuals who choose to
become unskilled workers and students respectively.
Government employs skilled workers as “educators” from high-tech sector
into the public sector. The term of “human capital” in our model includes
both skilled workers and educators. We assume that human capital is mobile
between high-tech sector and public sector. This means that the government
will only pay to the educators with the same going wage for skilled workers.
Therefore, education cost is expressed as
WHHe.
The education cost is financed by the income tax14, then the government
budget constraint is expressed as
WHHe = τ(WLL + WHH + rK),
where τ is the income tax rate15.
We assume domestic human capital can be produced with Cobb-Douglas
production function16 in the public sector which can be expressed as17
H = f(θ)Hγe U
1−γ
e , 0 < γ < 1, (3.8)
14See Abe (1990)
15τ can be solved with this equation, but we do not focus on the its effects in this
chapter.
16See footnote 8
17Since θ is assumed to be fixed throughout this chapter, differentiation of f(θ) could
be omitted.
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where γ can be interpreted as effect of educator-student ratio (He/Ue) on hu-
man capital quality, or in other words, on human capital per student (H/Ue)
can be acquired by individuals who choose to be educated since it can be
expressed as
γ =
∂(H/Ue)
∂(He/Ue)
· He/Ue
H/Ue
.
The government acts like a producer who produces ‘human capital’18 at
each period of t, using students and human capital itself as inputs19.
Now, we need to describe how Ue and Ul make their decisions. For sim-
plicity, we also assume that the domestic physical capital stock is owned by
all the individuals and there is perfectly equality in distribution of the capital
stock20. Then, in each period of t, each individual receives rk equally, where
k = K/NT . The lifetime income after tax for an unskilled worker and skilled
worker would therefore result in
18Compared to Ishikawa (2000) who shows a RV model with an intermediate good.
However, in his model, intermediate good is served as input for final good but not for
itself.
19Compared to Becker and Murphy (1992), which show that human capital acquired by
a student depends on the human capital of her teachers, and the number of teachers per
student. They also note that some good empirical studies like Card and Krueger (1990)
and Finn and Achilles (1990) found some evidence to the assumption above.
20Many studies assume this, for example, see Gupta (1994).
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(1− τ)
∫ T
0
(rk + WL) · e−ρtdt
= (1− τ) · 1
ρ
[
(rk + WL)(1− e−ρT )
]
,
(1− τ)
[ ∫ T
0
rk · e−ρtdt +
∫ T
θ
WH · H
Ue
· e−ρtdt
]
= (1− τ) · 1
ρ
[
rk(1− e−ρT ) + WH · H
Ue
(e−ρθ − e−ρT )
]
,
respectively, where ρ is fixed interest rate. As Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
points out, the lifetime income after tax for every individuals must be equal
in the long run equilibrium, which implies that
H
Ue
=
WL
WH
· R, (3.9)
where R ≡ (1− e−ρT )/(e−ρθ − e−ρT )21
H and Ue can be solved with equations (3.8) and (3.9) simultaneously,
given He , WL and WH . Substituting H into equation (3.6) we can solve for
Hp.
Ul can be solved with equation (3.7). Since there are only 2 generations
at each period of t, unskilled workers supply is given by
L = UlT. (3.10)
21Note that dBH/dUe < 0, where BH ≡ (1−τ )· 1
ρ
[
rk(1−e−ρT )+WH · H
Ue
(e−ρθ−e−ρT )
]
thus we know that Ue must be determined under the arbitrary condition.
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The model can be solved from equations (3.1) to (3.10) to solve for 10
variables, that is, WL, WH , r, X1, X2, Hp, L, Ue, Ul and H, given P , He, as
well as α, γ, β, K, N and i which are assumed to be fixed throughout this
chapter22.
3.3 Preliminaries
Let N , K and i be fixed throughout this chapter. Differentiating equations
from (3.1) to (3.10), the equations can be reduced as
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Λ −λL1 −1− λUl
λUl
0 1 −(1− γ)
δp
1
γ(1− α) 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
WˆL
Hˆp
Uˆe
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
22In particular, Hp and L can be solved as functions of (WL,WH , r; ·) while WL, WH
and r can be solved as functions of (P,Hp, L; ·), where (·) represents other variables treated
exogenously. Since WH and r can also be solved as functions of (P,WL) which is familiar
in RV model. In the end, the system above can be reduced to 3 equations which must be
solved simultaneously for WL, Hp and L.
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=⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Λ1
0
1
γ(1− α)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Pˆ +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
γ − (1− δp)
δp
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Hˆe (3.1)
where
λLi ≡ Li
L
, 0 < λLi < 1, for i = 1, 2, λL1 + λL2 = 1,
δp ≡ Hp
Hp + He
, 0 < δp < 1,
λUl ≡ Ul
Ul + Ue
, 0 < λUl < 1,
Λ1 ≡ λL1
1− α, Λ2 ≡
λL2
1− β , Λ ≡ Λ1 + Λ2.
(ˆ) denotes a proportionate change, for example, WˆL = dWL/WL. In partic-
ular, notice that δp represents the allocative share of domestic human capital
in private sector. In addition, we also have
Xˆ1 = Hˆp − α
1− α(WˆL − Pˆ ), (3.2)
Xˆ2 = − β
1− β · WˆL, (3.3)
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are so familiar where the first term in the RHS
of equation (3.2) represents the direct effect of human capital on the high-
tech good while keeping the factor prices hypothetically constant. We call
this effect as the direct effect. The second terms in the RHS of equation (3.2)
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Pˆ Hˆe
WˆL + +
Hˆp + ?
Xˆ1 + ?
Xˆ2 − −
Xˆ1 − Xˆ2 + ?
Table 3.1: The table shows the effects of P , He on WL, Hp, X1, X2 and X1/X2,
respectively. For example, the effect of P on WL is shown as ‘+’, and so on. ‘?’, ‘+’ and
‘−’ refer to indefinite effect, positive effect and negative effect, respectively.
and RHS of equation (3.3) represent effects on high-tech good and low-tech
good, respectively, due to the change in the factor prices which originated
from the disturbance in the factor markets. We call this as the indirect effect.
Using Cramel’s rule to solve equation (3.1), then substitute WˆL and Hˆp
into equations (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain the direct effects, indirect effects
and total effects of P , He on X1, X2 and X1/X2 which are shown in table
3.1.
The effects of He on Hp, X1 and X1/X2 are ambiguous. Since the am-
biguous effects mainly originated from the change in Hp, in particular, we
show that the effects of He on Hp can be decomposed into three parts which
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can be expressed as
Hˆp =
1
δp
[
γ(Hˆe − Uˆe) + Uˆe − (1− δp)Hˆe
]
, (3.4)
or alternatively,
Hˆp
Hˆe
=
1
|A|δp
[
Λδp +
(1− λUl)(γ + δp − 1)
λUlγ(1− α)
]
, (3.5)
where
|A| ≡ Λ + 1
γ(1− α)
[
Λ1(1− γ)
δp
+
1− λUl
λUl
]
> 0,
In general, the sign of Hˆp/Hˆe is not determined, however, we know that
the sign is positive (negative) if and only if
δp > (<)
(1− λUl)(1− γ)
1− λUl + γλUl
(
λL1 +
1− α
1− β · λL2
) , (3.6)
where RHS is obviously between 0 and 1 since the numerator is smaller than
the denominator and both of them are positive as well. In particular, we can
see that the condition is satisfied easier with larger β and γ, but smaller α.
The first term in the brace of equation (3.4) represents the effects on
educator-student ratio. Since higher quality of human capital can be acquired
as the ratio is higher, we call this as quality effect. The second term in the
brace of equation (3.4) represents the effects on number of individuals who
decide to be educated, we call this as quantity effect. The last term represents
the input effect which is negative, we call this as crowding out effect. The
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total effect particularly depends on δp, that is, allocative share of domestic
human capital in private sector. In particular, we can conclude as
Lemma 3.1 In the country with public human capital formation, an increase
in P always increases the human capital in private sector. On the other hand,
an increase in He increases (decreases) human capital in private sector, if γ
and β are sufficiently large (small) while α is sufficiently small (large).
Recall that γ represents the effect of educator-student ratio on human capital
quality. Larger effect means larger human capital per capita that students
can acquire, hence higher productivity and income they can get. This also
makes more individuals are willing to choose being educated. The problem is
whether the number of students will increase significantly hence overcome the
negative crowding out effect. This depends on the elasticities of demand for
unskilled workers in high-tech sector and low-tech sector, which are donoted
by α and β, respectively. Recall the familiar traditional RV model, if β is
large and α is small, then elasticity of demand for unskilled workers is large in
high-tech sector and small in low-tech sector, it follows that higher WH/WL
can be realized hence more individuals are willing to choose being educated
.
The indeterminacy of effect of He on Hp also brings ambiguous effects on
X1 and X1/X2. The signs of Xˆ1/Hˆe and (Xˆ1−Xˆ2)/Hˆe are positive (negative)
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if and only if
δp > (<)
A
B
, (3.7)
δp > (<)
C
D
, (3.8)
respectively, where
A ≡ (1− λUl)(1− γ)
B ≡ (1− λUl)(1− αγ) + γ(1− α)λUl
(
λL1 +
λL2
1− β
)
C ≡ (1− λUl)(1− γ)
D ≡ (1− λUl)(1− αγ) + γ(1− α)
1− β
[
λUl + (1− λUl)β
]
Since A > 0, B > 0, C > 0, D > 0, and A < B, C < D, the RHS
of equations (3.7) and (3.8) are between 0 and 1. It follows that we can
conclude the results above as
Lemma 3.2 In the country with public human capital formation,
(a). an increase in P always increases X1 but decreases X2, hence increases
X1/X2, and
(b). an increase in He always decreases X2.
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(c). On the other hand, if γ and β are sufficiently large (small) while α
is sufficiently small (large), an increase in He increases (decreases)
X1/X2 as well as X1,
Lemma 3.2(a) says that X1/X2 is an increasing function of P while lemma
3.2(c) says that relative supply curve does not necessarily shift to the right
due to an increase in He.
3.4 Trade Patterns
To see how the relative price of final goods change, the demand side of the
final goods has to be stated explicitly. We can express the relative demand
which is denoted by D as a function of P on the demand side, if we as-
sume homothetic preferences 23. Then the domestic market equilibrium is
expressed as
X = D(P ),
where X ≡ X1/X2. Differentiating the equation above and using the results
in table 3.1, we obtain
Pˆ
Hˆe
= −(Xˆ
Pˆ
+ σD)
−1 · Xˆ
Hˆe
, (3.1)
23Although there are two kinds of individual in this model, identical preferences as-
sumption is unnecessary as long as their lifetime income are all the same as well as their
fixed rate of time preferences which are equal to the market rate of interest.
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where σD ≡ −D′(P )P/D(P ) is the price elasticity of demand.
In the lemma 3.1 and 3.2, we have examined the effect of P on X which
is positive, whereas the effect of He on X is ambiguous, hence the total effect
is ambiguous as well. Let us define that
Definition 3.1
A country with more (less) human capital employed in private sector is called
human capital abundant (scarce) country.
Hence we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1
Suppose that there are two countries with public human capital formation
where preferences, technology, capital endowment and population are iden-
tical. If the effect of educator-student ratio on human capital quality and
income share of unskilled workers in low-tech sector are sufficiently large
(small), then the country that allocates more domestic human capital into
the public sector tends to be human capital abundant (scarce) country, hence
exports (imports) high-tech final good and imports (exports) low-tech final
good.
Again, the argument in the proposition 3.1 can easily be predicted from
the lemma 3.1 and 3.2. If an increase in He decreases the human capital
supply in private sector instead, then the government will fail to enhance the
competitiveness of high-tech sector.
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Notice also that since an increase in He decreases Hp but increases H when
γ is small24, if ‘human capital abundant country’ is defined as a country with
larger H instead of Hp, then we can conclude as ‘human capital abundant
country imports high-tech final good and exports low-tech final good’, which
is a paradox25.
3.5 Foreign Human Capital Mobility
We examine the effect of He on factor mobility among countries in this sec-
tion, let us focus only on the human capital mobility rather than capital
mobility, the effect of He on WˆL − WˆH can be obtained as
WˆL − WˆH = WˆL − Pˆ
1− α , (3.1)
From the table 3.1, we know that
WˆL
Hˆe
> 0. (3.2)
24See equations (3.6) and (3.5.)
25See Leontief (1956) and Ishizawa (1988), where Ishizawa (1988) shows the Leontief
paradox through the public sectors which depends on assumptions of the factor intensities
and the size of the economy. Furthermore, the definition of ‘abundant’ may have played a
great role to the paradox.
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From equation (3.1) and (3.2) it is easy to show that
WˆH
Hˆe
< 0. (3.3)
Equation (3.2) says an increase in He always decreases WH . From equation
(3.9) we can also easily see that WH is an decreasing function of H instead
of Hp which is different from the traditional RV model.
Recall the lemma 3.1 and consider the case of a country where the ef-
fect of educator-student ratio on human capital quality and income share of
unskilled workers in low-tech sector are sufficiently small, then we have
Hˆp
Hˆe
< 0. (3.4)
Equation (3.4) says that when the country allocates less domestic human
capital into the public sector, the human capital employed in private sector
increases. In the meantime, equation (3.3) shows the factor price for human
capital in the country rises, which is opposite compared to the traditional
effect. Suppose that equation (3.4) is satisfied. Consider the case in which
there are only country A and country B exit in the world. If country A
allocates less domestic human capital into the public sector, then country A
has the comparative advantage in the production of high-tech good but higher
wage for skilled workers compared to country B, which is totally opposite
compared to that in the traditional RV model.
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Suppose country A is the advanced industrial country while country B
is the developing country in this case, human capital moves from developing
country to advanced industrial country. Recall the words of World Develop-
ment Report: “Can something be done to stop the exodus of trained workers
from poorer countries?” (World Bank, 1995, p. 64)26. Government can re-
duce its public service by decreasing the number of educator but still can
enhance its high-tech sector and improve the brain drain problem.
Hence we can conclude as
Proposition 3.2
Suppose that there are two countries with public human capital formation
where preferences, technology, capital endowment and population are iden-
tical. If the effect of educator-student ratio on human capital quality and
income share of unskilled workers in low-tech sector are sufficiently small,
then the country that allocates less educators into the public sector tends to
export high-tech final good and have higher factor price for human capital.
Proposition 3.2 implies that if human capital mobility is allowed between
the two countries in a free trade world, human capital moves from the coun-
try which exports high-tech final good into the country which imports it.
This is the crucial result in the present chapter. A government can reduce
its educators but still can enhance the high-tech sector. More surprisingly,
26See Stark-Helmenstein-Prskawetz 1998.
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despite the country becomes human capital abundant country and exports
high-tech final good, the wage for human capital rises and creats an incentive
for foreign human capital inflow. As a result, there is an additional positive
effect on the output of high-tech final good, instead of crowding out effect
brought by brain drain, as long as foreign human capital inflow is allowed.
Notice that the total human capital supply decreases as a whole, which has
caused the rise in factor price for human capital.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have examined the relationships between trade patterns
and human capital mobility. We have found that the RV model still can be
applied to explain why skilled workers tend to move from developing countries
to developed countries. One of the most important characters is that we use
only very simple model to capture the human capital formation and derive
some different results compared to many studies.
Our results can best be concluded in proposition 3.2. Some other policy
implications can also be discussed. For example, consider the case of for-
eign human capital inflow. If the effect of educator-student ratio on human
capital quality and income share of unskilled workers in low-tech sector are
sufficiently large (small), a government should hire foreign human capital to
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work as educators in education sector (skilled workers in private high-tech
sector) to enhance the high-tech sector in a more effective way.
Notice that we have only compared the cases in an equilibrium. The
analysis of welfare can also be done in this chapter. Other than that, the
education can also be financed by the students. However, we need to obtain
some more tractable results for the future research. The analysis of effect of
brain drain on welfare is important for policy implications, but we just leave
this to the future research.
B Appendix
B.1 Calculation
Differentiating equations from (3.1) to (3.10), we have27
αWˆL + (1− α)WˆH = Pˆ , (B.1)
βWˆL + (1− β)rˆ = 1, (B.2)
λL1Xˆ1 + λL2Xˆ2 = Lˆ− λL1(1− α)(WˆH − WˆL)
−λL2(1− β)(rˆ − WˆL), (B.3)
Xˆ1 = Hˆp − α(WˆL − WˆH), (B.4)
27Notice that i is fixed.
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Xˆ2 = Kˆ − β(WˆL − rˆ), (B.5)
Hˆ = δpHˆp + (1− δp)Hˆe, (B.6)
Nˆ = λUlUˆl + (1− λUl)Uˆe, (B.7)
Hˆ = γHˆe + (1− γ)Uˆe, (B.8)
Hˆ − Uˆe = WˆL − WˆH , (B.9)
Lˆ = Uˆl, (B.10)
Since N and K are assumed to be fixed throughout this paper, Nˆ = Kˆ = 0
hold. Equations (B.1) to (B.5) are the familiar basic equations of the RV
model. Considering equations (B.1) and (B.2) can also be rewritten as
WˆL − WˆH = WˆL − Pˆ
1− α , (B.11)
WˆL − rˆ = WˆL
1− β , (B.12)
we can solve WˆL easily given Pˆ , Hˆp and Lˆ as
WˆL =
1
Λ
(
Λ1Pˆ + λL1Hˆp − Lˆ
)
, (B.13)
which is familiar. Substitute equations (B.11) and (B.12) into equations
(B.4) and (B.5), we obtain equations (3.2) and (3.3).
Using equations (B.6) and (B.8) to solve for Hˆp, we obtain
Hˆp =
1
δp
[
(γ + δp − 1)Hˆe + (1− γ)Uˆe
]
. (B.14)
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Substitute equation (B.8) into equation (B.9) to eliminate Hˆ and rewrite
it by using equation (B.11), we have
Hˆe − Uˆe = 1
γ
· WˆL − Pˆ
1− α . (B.15)
Substitute equation (B.7) into equation (B.10) to eliminate Ul, we obtain
Lˆ = −(1− λUl)Uˆe
λUl
. (B.16)
We can also substitute equation (B.15) into equations (B.14) and (B.16)
to eliminate Uˆe, but since we are more interested in the effects on Ue instead,
we substitute equation (B.16) into equation (B.13) to eliminate Lˆ, hence we
have
WˆL =
1
Λ
(
Λ1Pˆ + λL1Hˆp +
(1− λUl)Uˆe
λUl
)
. (B.17)
From equations (B.14), (B.15) and (B.17), we obtain equation (3.1) as shown
in context.
Using Cramel’s rule to solve equation (3.1), then substitute WˆL and Hˆp
into equations (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain the results shown in table 3.2, where
|A| ≡ Λ + 1
γ(1− α)
[
Λ1(1− γ)
δp
+
1− λUl
λUl
]
> 0,
|A11| ≡ Λ1 + 1
γ(1− α)
[
Λ1(1− γ)
δp
+
1− λUl
λUl
]
> 0,
|A12| ≡ 1
λUl
[
(1− λUl) + λUlλL1
]
> 0,
|A21| ≡ Λ2(1− γ)
γ(1− α)δp > 0,
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Pˆ Hˆe
WˆL
|A11|
|A| > 0
|A12|
|A| > 0
Hˆp
|A21|
|A| > 0
|A22|
|A| ?
Uˆe
|A31|
|A| > 0
|A32|
|A| > 0
Xˆ1
|A41|
|A| > 0
|A42|
|A| ?
Xˆ2
|A51|
|A| < 0
|A52|
|A| < 0
Xˆ1 − Xˆ2 |A61||A| > 0
|A62|
|A| ?
Table 3.2: The table shows the effects of P and He on WL, HP , Ue, X1, X2 and X1/X2,
respectively. For example, the effect of P on WL is shown as |A11|/|A| > 0, and so on. ‘?’
refers to indefinite effect.
|A22| ≡ 1
δp
[
Λδp +
(1− λUl)(γ + δp − 1)
λUlγ(1− α)
]
,
|A31| ≡ Λ2
γ(1− α) > 0,
|A32| ≡ Λ2 + Λ1
[
(1− δp)(1− γ)
δpγ
]
> 0,
|A41| ≡ |A21|+ α
1− α
(
|A| − |A11|
)
> 0,
... |A| > |A11|,
|A42| ≡ (1− λUl)[δp(1− γα)− (1− γ)]
(1− α)λUlδpγ + λL1 + Λ2,
|A51| ≡ − β
1− β · |A11| < 0,
|A52| ≡ − β
1− β · |A12| > 0,
|A61| ≡ |A41| − |A51| > 0,
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|A62| ≡ 1
λUl
[
λUl
1− β + (1− λUl)
(
1− γα
γ(1− α) +
β
1− β
)
+
(1− λUl)
δp(1− α)
(
1− 1
γ
)]
B.2 Decomposition of Effects on Hp
Let us explain why an increase in He does not necessarily increase Hp.
Rewritting equation (B.14), we obtain equation (3.4) as shown in context.
Let us see the quality effect and the quantity effect of He as defined in
context. Holding P fixed, from equations (B.8), (B.9) and (B.11), the quality
effect can be expressed as
γ(Hˆe − Uˆe) = WˆL
1− α. (B.18)
Since WˆL/Hˆe = |A12| > 0 as shown in table 3.2, the quality effect of He is
positive. On the other hand, the quantity effect of He is also positive which
can be predicted from Uˆe/Hˆe = |A32|/|A| as shown in table 3.2. Thus the
sum of the quality effect and quantity effect of He is positive which can be
expressed as
γ(Hˆe − Uˆe) + Uˆe =
(
|A12|
1− α + |A32|
)
Hˆe > 0. (B.19)
Unfortunately, not only the crowding out effect is negative but also the total
effect of He on Hp ends up an ambiguous effect which can be predicted from
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Hˆp/Hˆe = |A22|/|A| as shown in table 3.2. The sign is positive (negative) if
and only if
δp > (<)
(1− λUl)(1− γ)
1− λUl + γλUl
(
λL1 +
1− α
1− β · λL2
) , (B.20)
where RHS is obviously between 0 and 1 since numerator is smaller than
denominator and both of them are positive as well. In particular, we can
see that the condition is satisfied easier with larger β and γ, and smaller α,
hence we have lemma 3.1.
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Part II
Technology Change and Wage
Inequality
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Chapter 4
Technology Change and
Endogenous Labor Supply in a
Small Open Country
4.1 Introduction
Technical change in Europe and Asia and Latin America could have con-
tributed to the lower wage of unskilled labor and increased income inequality
that the United States has been experiencing. Many economists have argued
that skilled labor biased technical change has contributed to rising income
equality in those countries. However, in the framework of traditional HOS
model, it is possible that factor bias of technical progress does not affect
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relative factor prices.
Following the dispute between Leamer (1998) and Krugman (2000), we
repeat some explanation of the terminology regarding sector bias and factor
bias. When technical progress occurs in a sector definitely raises relative
factor prices in the same way regardless of which factor is involved in the
technical progress, we say sector bias does matter for relative factor prices
but factor bias does not. On the other hand, when the effect of technical
progress on relative factor prices depends on which factor is involved, we say
factor bias does matter for relative prices but sector bias does not.
In fact, biased technical change may even lower the price of the factor
reward in which it is biased if the biased technical change occurs in the
sector where the factor is not used intensively. What would happen if tech-
nical progress occurs in a sector but only one of the factors is involved? As
Krugman (2000) emphasizes, in the case of one-good economy where only
skilled labor and unskilled labor are used in production, Hicks-neutral (HN)
technical progress will not change relative wages, whereas skilled labor bi-
ased technical progress will raise skilled labor wage, hence factor bias rather
than sector bias matters for relative wages. On the other hand, in the case
of multi-good models, for example, as Leamer (1998) emphasizes that any
improvement in the technology for producing a good will raise skilled labor
wage if skilled labor is intensively used for the good, regardless of whether
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skilled labor biased or unskilled labor biased technical progress takes place,
hence sector bias rather than factor bias matters for relative wages. It finally
leads to a conclusion that the emphasis on factor bias suggested by the one-
good model is all wrong when we are consider multi-good, that is, sector bias
matters for relative wages but factor bias does not. Krugman (2000) shows
an opposite view and argues that in the case of a small-economy model, HN
technical progress in the skilled labor intensive sector does not necessarily
raise skilled to unskilled wage, and indeed, lowers skilled to unskilled wage
under certain assumptions, for example, in the case of Cobb-Douglas de-
mand. He concludes that a two-sector model behaves just like the one-sector
model under this assumption.
Xu (2001) investigates the effects of technical progress on relative wages in
the 2x2x2 HOS model and sorts out the arguments between Leamer (1998)
and Krugman (2000). He classifies technical progress according to factor-
augmenting bias, factor-using bias and HN and clarifies the conditions for
factor bias and sector bias to impact relative wages. On the other hand,
as many studies insist, exploration in other conceptual framework, namely
the RV1 (RV) framework that has sectoral immobile unskilled labor is also
important. We examine the effects of technical change on relative wages in
RV model instead of HOS model, moreover we will also let labor supplies be
1See Jones 1971
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elastic.
Unlike in the HOS model, RV model makes difference for the effects of
technical progress on wages. Under the assumption of inelastic factor supply,
elasticities of factor demand are not significant for the signs. Indeed, Rodrik
(1997) explains important implications of more-elastic factor demands. The
factor supplies we apply to this chapter, are all in terms of labor, that is, two
kinds of sectoral-immobile skilled labor and one kind of common unskilled
labor. Moreover, their supplies are all endogenously determined. We apply
the basic idea of Findlay-Kierzkowski (1983)2.
We examine two kinds of technical progress, that is, (1) Product-specific
skilled labor augmenting and (2) Product-specific unskilled labor augmenting
technical progress. Both of the technical progress take place at the same sec-
tor. As we have refered previously, if skilled to unskilled wage rises in both of
the cases, then sector bias rather than factor bias matters for relative wages.
On the contrary, if skilled to unskilled wage declines in the case of product-
specific unskilled labor augmenting but rises in the case of product-specific
skilled labor augmenting, then factor bias rather than sector bias matters for
relative wages. We will show that whether factor bias or sector bias matters
for relative wages in this framework, depends on the elasticities of substitu-
2Ishikawa (2000) is also remarkable, he constructs a RV model by replacing one of the
sector-specific factors with a sector-specific intermediate good.
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tion between factors (ESF) which comes to a conclusion as in the traditional
RV model, although there are some additional effects on individual wages
rather than relative wages.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Traditional Ricardo-Viner Model
with Technical Change
Let us consider a small open country. There are two private sectors which
produce final goods, X1 and X2, respectively. ith sector produces Xi using
ith skilled labor and unskilled labor, (i = 1, 2), which are denoted by Lpi
and Lp3. L
p
i is sectoral-immobile and L
p
3 is sectoral-mobile. The production
function is expressed as Xi = Xi(βiL
p
3i
, αiL
p
i ), (i = 1, 2), where L
p
3i
represents
the amount of unskilled labor used by ith sector. αi and βi are positive and
initially equal to one, which are shift parameters of technical change of Lpi and
Lp3i in ith sector, respectively. There are technical progress if their value are
larger than one. For example, unskilled labor augmenting technical progress
occurs in 1st sector if β1 > 1. Define W˜i ≡ Wi/αi and W˜3i ≡ W3/βi, where
Wi and W3 are ith skilled labor wage and unskilled labor wage.
Following the traditional RV model, the profit conditions for the ith pri-
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vate sector is expressed as
Ci(W˜3i , W˜i) = Pi, for i = 1, 2, (4.1)
where Ci and Pi are the unit cost function of the ith private sector and the
price of the ith good, respectively. P2 ≡ 1 is chosen as a numeraire. The full
employment conditions are expressed as
2∑
i=1
Ci3(W˜3i, W˜i)Xi = L
p
3, (4.2)
Cii (W˜3i, W˜i)Xi = L
p
i , for i = 1, 2, (4.3)
where the subscripts for the unit cost functions with a variable are the partial
derivatives of the factor price related to the variables and represent the input
coefficients of the factor in the ith private sector. For example, Ci3(W˜3i , W˜i) ≡
∂Ci(W˜3i, W˜i)/∂W˜3i is the input coefficient of the unskilled labor in the ith
private sector. From the equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), given Lp3, L
p
1, L
p
2 and
P1, we can solve for W˜3i , W˜1, W˜2, X1 and X2. Wi and W3 can be solved given
αi and βi.
Differentiate equations (4.1) to (4.3), setting Pˆi = 0 and solve for Wˆ3 and
Wˆi, yields
Wˆ3 =
Λ1βˆ1 + Λ2βˆ2
Λ
− Sˆ
Λ
, (4.4)
Wˆ1 =
Λ2θ31(βˆ1 − βˆ2) + Λθ1αˆ1
Λθ1
+
θ31Sˆ
Λθ1
, (4.5)
Wˆ2 =
Λ1θ32(βˆ2 − βˆ1) + Λθ2αˆ2
Λθ2
+
θ32Sˆ
Λθ2
, (4.6)
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where
Sˆ ≡ Lˆp3 − (λ31Lˆp1 + λ32Lˆp2),
Λi ≡ λ3ie3i , for i = 1, 2, Λ1 + Λ2 = Λ.
e3i ≡
σi
θi
, for i = 1, 2
θ3i ≡
W3iC
i
3(·)
Pi
, for i = 1, 2,
θi ≡ WiC
i
i(·)
Pi
, θ3i + θi = 1, for i = 1, 2
σi ≡ Cˆ
i
i(·)− Cˆi3(·)
Wˆ3 − Wˆi
> 0, for i = 1, 2
λ3i ≡
Ci3(·)Xi
Lp3
, for i = 1, 2, λ31 + λ32 = 1.
(ˆ) denotes a proportionate change, for example, Wˆ3 = dW3/W3. θ3i and
θi are the familiar income shares in HOS model or RV model. σi and λ3i
are, respectively, the ESF and the fraction of unskilled labor in ith sector.
e3i and Λ are, respectively, the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor in
the ith sector and the aggregate general-equilibrium elasticity of demand for
unskilled labor in the private sectors. We call Sˆ as the proportionate change
in the supply of unskilled labor relative to an “aggregate” of skilled labor3.
The first terms in the RHS of equations (4.4) to (4.6) represent the tra-
ditional effects while the second terms represent the additional effect due to
the change in labor supplies through the labor market which may bring some
3Note that the definition of S is not Lp1+L
p
2. The definition of Sˆ here follows Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (c1983).
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perverse results.
4.2.2 Formation of Labor Supply
In this section, we apply the basic idea of Findlay-Kierzkowski (1983) to show
how labor supplies are endogenously determined.
We assume that N individuals are born and N individuals die in each
period in the economy, all live for 2 periods, this means that the population
is in the steady state. Government provides two public services for those
who want to be educated under the public service for free but forgoing the
opportunity to participate in the unskilled labor market during the first ed-
ucation period. We can see from above, there are three kinds of decision
maker (E1, E2, E3) among the new generation(N) in each period of t, where
Ei (i = 1, 2)denotes the ith students who decide to earn their income under
wage rate (Wi) as a ith skilled labor after having enjoyed the ith public ser-
vice, while E3 denotes those who decide not to enjoy the public services and
participate in the unskilled labor market to earn their income under wage
rate (W3). Now, we can describe how E1, E2 and E3 make their decisions.
We assume that the ith public service is provided by the government by em-
ploying the ith skilled labor from the ith private sector into the ith public
sector. Let Qi denote the ith ‘skilled labor’ or human capital that the gov-
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ernment can ‘produce’ at each period of t, while Lgi denotes the amount of
the ith skilled labor or educators as public servants employed by the govern-
ment in the ith public sector at each period of t. The government acts like
a producer who produces ‘skilled labor’ at each period of t, using educators
(i.e. Lgi ) and students (i.e. Ei) as inputs
4. The production function of the
ith public sector can be expressed as
Qi = Fi(L
g
i , Ei), for i = 1, 2.
Fi(·) is increasing, strictly quasi-concave, positively linear homogeneous and
twice continuously differentiable. Because of the linear homogenity, the equa-
tion above also can be expressed as
Qi
Ei
= qi = fi(l
g
i ),
fi(0) > 0 f
′
i > 0 f
′′
i < 0 l
g
i =
Lgi
Ei
, for i = 1, 2,
where lgi is the ith public service-beneficiary ratio, we can also put it in a more
particular way such as ith educator-student ratio. Lgi is valued at efficiency
unit, and is the amount of ith skilled labor as public input in the ith public
sector, which is treated as exogenous. qi is the effectiveness or quality per
ith student they can acquire as a member of ith skilled labor in the future5 .
4Note that, however, the government does not act as a profit maximizer.
5Compare to Becker and Murphy (1992), which shows that the human capital acquired
by a student depends on the human capital of her teachers, and the number of teachers
per student.
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The lifetime income of E3 and Ei valued at present value are
B3 = (1− τ)W3(1 + 1
1 + ρ
),
Bi = (1− τ)Wifi(lgi ) ·
1
1 + ρ
,
for i = 1, 2, where ρ is the fixed interest rate, and 0 < τ < 1 is the income
tax rate imposed by the government to finance the public services6. Because
dBi/dEi < 0, we know that Ei must be determined under the arbitrary
condition as
B1 = B2 = B3,
which yields
fi(l
g
i ) =
W3
Wi
· R, for i = 1, 2. (4.7)
where R ≡ 2 + ρ is assumed to be fixed. From the equation (4.7), we know
that Ei depends on fi as well as W3/W1 and W3/W2. Given ρ, N , L
g
1, L
g
2, in
addition to W1, W2 and, W3, we can solve for E1 and E2, then, we get the
value of E3 with the new generation of the population constraint as
E1 + E2 + E3 = N. (4.8)
The total ith labor is expressed as
Fi(L
g
i , Ei) = fi(l
g
i )Ei = Li, for i = 1, 2, (4.9)
6We will show how this income tax rate is to be solved by the government budget
constraint.
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L3 = 2E3, (4.10)
For the time being, the full employment conditions can be expressed as
Li = L
g
i + L
p
i , for i = 1, 2 (4.11)
L3 = L
p
3, (4.12)
The government budget constraint is expressed as
2∑
i=1
WiL
g
i = τ [
2∑
i=1
Wi(L
p
i + L
g
i ) + W3L3]. (4.13)
Let us call the economy above as endogenous labor supply economy and
consider also equations (4.4) to (4.6), we have
Lemma 4.1 In the endogenous labor supply economy, the effect of technical
change on factor prices is decomposed into two parts which are called direct
effect and indirect effect. The indirect effect is due to the change in labor
supply which is caused by the change in factor prices through technical change.
4.3 Indirect Effect
Differentiating equations from (4.7) to (4.10), holding other exogenous vari-
ables fixed, we can solve Lp3 and L
p
i in terms of Wˆ3 and Wˆi, which eventually
solve all the endogenous variables in the model. Since all factors in this
model are endogenously determined, it is more important to see the change
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in the supply of unskilled labor relative to an “aggregate” of skilled labor
rather than the change Lp3 or L
p
i individually when we want to see the effects
on factor prices. Hence, it is convenient to solve Lp3 and L
p
i in terms of Sˆ as
Sˆ =
[Λ1Λ
η
2 + Λ
η
1(θ1Λ1 − θ31Λ2)]βˆ1 + [Λ2Λη1 + Λη2(θ2Λ2 − θ32Λ1)]βˆ2
Λ + Λη
−ΛΛ
η
1θ1αˆ1 + ΛΛ
η
2θ2αˆ2
Λ + Λη
, (4.1)
where
Ληi ≡
1 + Λpi γi
Λpi θi
· ηi > 0, for i = 1, 2, Λη = Λη1 + Λη2,
σqi ≡
f ′i(l
g
i )l
g
i
fi(l
g
i )
, for i = 1, 2, 0 < σqi < 1
γi ≡ Ei
E3
> 0, for i = 1, 2,
Λpi ≡
Lpi
Li
, for i = 1, 2 0 < Λpi < 1
ηi ≡ 1− σ
q
i
σqi
> 0
Note also that if βˆ1 = βˆ2 = βˆ, from equation 4.1 we have
Sˆ
βˆ
=
Λ(θ1Λ
η
1 + θ2Λ
η
2)
Λ + Λη
> 0,
Equation (4.1) can be used to examine the total effects on wages of various
types of technical change. Before we go for the analysis in the next section,
we can conclude here as
Lemma 4.2 In the endogenous labor supply economy,
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(a). a product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress always de-
creases the supply of unskilled labor relative to an “aggregate” of skilled
labor, hence it brings a negative indirect effect for W1 and W2 but pos-
itive indirect effect for W3.
(b). a product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical progress in the
1st (2nd) sector increases the supply of unskilled labor relative to an
“aggregate” of skilled labor if Λη1 (Λ
η
2), θ31 (θ32) and Λ2 (Λ1) are suffi-
ciently small, hence it brings a positive indirect effect for W1 and W2
but negative indirect effect for W3.
(c). if product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical progress in the
1st sector and the 2nd sector are the same, it always increases the
supply of unskilled labor relative to an “aggregate” of skilled labor.,
hence it brings a positive indirect effect for W1 and W2 but negative
indirect effect for W3.
When there is a product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress,
for instance, in the 1st sector, holding other fixed, we can see that from
equations (4.4) to (4.6) W3/W1 will decline, hence increases E1 while dereases
E3. Thus we have lemma 4.2(a). When there is a product-specific unskilled
labor augmenting technical progress, for instance, in the 1st sector, from the
equations (4.4) to (4.6), we know that W3/W2 will rise due to the direct
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effect through a rise in β1. L2 will decrease in only a smaller extent if there
is smaller Λη2, that is, smaller marginal quality which can be acquired in the
2nd education is given up. On the other hand, W3/W1 may rise or decline
since both W1 and W3 rise through the direct effect due to the rise in β1.
If θ31 is sufficiently large or/and the elasticity of demand for uskilled labor
in 2nd sector is sufficiently larger than that in 1st sector (i.e. Λ2 > Λ1),
obviously W3 will rise with a smaller extent than W1. It follows that W3/W1
rises in this case hence we have a rise in E1 and a decline in E3. Again,
L1 will increase in only a larger extent if there is larger Λ
η
1 since individuals
(i.e. E1) are getting larger marginal quality which can be acquired in the 1st
education. After all, the sign of Sˆ depends on Λη1, Λ1, Λ2 and θ31. When Λ
η
1,
Λ1, Λ2 and θ31 are sufficiently large, and Λ
η
2 is sufficiently small, then there
are sufficiently rise in L1, small decline in L2 and decline in L3. Hence we
have negative sign of Sˆ and lemma 4.2(b). Lemma 4.2(c) can be explained
as in lemma 4.2(a) but just in the opposite way.
4.4 Technical Change
In this subsection, we are going to examine whether factor bias or sector bias
matters for relative wages in one of the sectors. We examine two types of
technical change in this section, which are specified as
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1. product-specific skilled labor (sectoral-immobile) augmenting, where
αˆ1 > 0 = βˆ1 = βˆ2 = αˆ2
2. product-specific unskilled labor (sectoral-mobile) augmenting, where
βˆ1 > 0 = βˆ2 = αˆ1 = αˆ2
Substitute the classified parameter into equations (4.4) and (4.5), we can
examine product-specific skilled labor augmenting and product-specific un-
skilled labor augmenting types of technical change7.
We repeat what we are going to do here, that is, if skilled to unskilled
wage rises in both of the cases, then we can conclude that sector bias rather
than factor bias matters for relative wages. On the contrary, if skilled to
unskilled wage rises in the case of product-specific skilled labor augmenting
but declines in the case of product-specific unskilled labor augmenting, then
factor bias rather than sector bias matters for relative wages.
4.4.1 Product-specific Skilled Labor Augmenting
Technical Progress (in 1st sector)
We first examine product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress
(in 1st sector) in this subsection. We are going to see whether product-
specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress will raise skilled to un-
7Since W1 and W2 are symmetric, we focus only on W1.
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skilled wage or not. The final conclusion will not be established in this
subsection, but it is important for us to conclude whether factor bias or sec-
tor bias matters for skilled to unskilled wage. Hence the result we obtain
here is essential for the whole story.
The value of parameters correspond with this case are
αˆ1 > 0 = βˆ1 = βˆ2 = αˆ2. (4.1)
Substitute equation (4.1) into equation (4.1), we have
Sˆ
αˆ1
= − θ1ΛΛ
η
1
Λ + Λη
< 0, (4.2)
The effect on Sˆ due to the change in the wages which is caused by the
technical progress. This repeats what we have concluded in lemma 4.2(a),
that is, product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress always
decreases the supply of unskilled labor relative to an “aggregate” of skilled
labor, which brings positive effect on W3 but negative effects for W1 and W2.
The most important thing in this subsection is to see the effects on skilled
to unskilled wage. Substitute equation (4.2) into equation (4.4) and (4.5),
we obtain
Wˆ3
αˆ1
= 0 +
θ1Λ
η
1
Λ + Λη
> 0,
Wˆ1
αˆ1
= 1− θ31Λ
η
1
Λ + Λη
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=
Λ + θ1Λ
η
1 + Λ
η
2
Λ + Λη
> 0,
which yields
Wˆ1 − Wˆ3
αˆ1
= 1− θ31Λ
η
1
Λ + Λη
− θ1Λ
η
1
Λ + Λη
=
Λ + Λη2
Λ + Λη
> 0. (4.3)
To see the effects of product-specific skilled labor augmenting on relative
wage in 1st sector, let us focus on equation (4.3). The first term in the RHS
of the first equality, that is, 1 represents the traditional direct effect of the
product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress, which affects
skilled to unskilled wage positively. This is because there is no effect on un-
skilled labor wage under product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical
progress in the traditional RV model. The second term and the third term
represent the indirect effects which affect skilled to unskilled wage negatively.
Although the direct effect and the indirect effect have oppositive signs in this
framework, the total effect remains positive. Hence in this framework, the
effects of product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress on rel-
ative wages remains unchanged compared to the traditional RV model. How-
ever, the most important implication is whether skilled to unskilled wage rises
or not under product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress.
What we have obtained here is that skilled to unskilled wage must rise under
product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical progress.
The next things is to clarify whether skilled to unskilled wage rises even in
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the case of product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical progress. If
it rises, then we can conclude that sector bias rather that factor bias matters
for relative wages and vice versa.
4.4.2 Product-specific Unskilled Labor Augmenting
Technical Progress (in 1st sector)
In this subsection, we will show the effect of product-specific unskilled labor
augmenting technical progress on skilled to unskilled wage. As concluded
in lemma 4.2(b), we will have some ambiguous indirect effect. However, the
important thing is to see the total effect on skilled to unskilled wage and then
conclude whether factor bias or sector bias matters for skilled to unskilled
wage with the consideration of the result we have obtained in the previous
subsection.
The value of parameters correspond with this case are
βˆ1 > 0 = βˆ2 = αˆ1 = αˆ2. (4.4)
Substitute equation (4.4) into equation (4.1), we have
Sˆ
βˆ1
=
Λ1Λ
η
2 + Λ
η
1(θ1Λ1 − θ31Λ2)
Λ + Λη
. (4.5)
As shown in lemma 4.2(b), product-specific unskilled labor augmenting tech-
nical progress in the 1st (2nd) sector increases the supply of unskilled labor
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relative to an “aggregate” of skilled labor if Λη1 (Λ
η
2), θ31 (θ32) and Λ2 (Λ1)
are sufficiently small, hence it brings a positive indirect effect for W1 and W2
but negative indirect effect for W3.
To see effects on skilled to unskilled wage, we first substitute equation
(4.5) into equation (4.4) and (4.5) and obtain
Wˆ3
βˆ1
=
Λ1
Λ
− Λ1Λ
η
2 + Λ
η
1(θ1Λ1 − θ31Λ2)
Λ(Λ + Λη)
=
θ31Λ
η
1 + Λ1
Λ + Λη
> 0,
Wˆ1
βˆ1
=
θ31Λ2
θ1Λ
+
θ31[Λ1Λ
η
2 + Λ
η
1(θ1Λ1 − θ31Λ2)]
θ1Λ(Λ + Λη)
=
θ31(θ1Λ
η
1 + Λ2 + Λ
η
2)
θ1(Λ + Λη)
> 0,
which yields
Wˆ1 − Wˆ3
βˆ1
=
θ31Λ2 − θ1Λ1
θ1Λ
+
Λ1Λ
η
2 + Λ
η
1(θ1Λ1 − θ31Λ2)
θ1Λ(Λ + Λη)
=
θ31(Λ
η
2 + Λ2)− θ1Λ1
θ1(Λ + Λη)
. (4.6)
To see the effects of product-specific unskilled labor augmenting on the
relative wage in 1st sector, let us focus on equation (4.6). The first term in
the RHS of the first equality, shows the ambiguity of the effect on skilled
to unskilled wage in the sector while the second term represents the indirect
effect where its sign is determined. However, the total effect remains ambigu-
ous which is shown in the second equality. Hence it establishes the validity
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in the case of product-specific unskilled labor augmenting compared to the
traditonal RV model since it remains true whether skilled to unskilled wage
rises or declines depends on the ESF, that is, if Λ1 is sufficiently large, then
the sign in equation (4.6) is negative hence skilled to unskilled wage declines
and vice versa.
The determination of the sign in equation (4.6) is very important for our
conclusion since we have to clarify whether unskilled labor augmentation in
a sector results in the same way as skilled labor augmentation in the same
sector, if so, any improvement of technology in a sector brings the same
result for relative wages, hence sector bias rather than factor bias matters for
relative wages as Leamer (1998) insists, otherwise we will have the opposite
result as Krugman (2000) argues.
4.4.3 Sector Bias vs Factor Bias
From the subsections previous, we know that whether sector bias or factor
bias matters for relative wages, depends on how skilled to unskilled wage
reacts in the case of product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical
progress. If Λ1 is sufficiently small, then skilled to unskilled wage rises. It
follows that any improvement of technology in a sector will affect the relative
wages in the same way. Hence we can conclude that sector bias rather than
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factor bias matters for relative wages. On the contrary, if Λ1 is sufficiently
large, then skilled to unskilled wage declines. Hence we can conclude that
improvement of technology towards skilled labor (unskilled labor) in any
sector will raise (reduce) skilled to unskilled wage in the sector. Hence we
can conclude that factor bias rather than sector bias matters for relative
wages.
Finally, we can conclude the results above as
Proposition 4.1
In the endogenous labor supply economy, sector bias (factor bias) matters for
relative wages if ESF is sufficiently small (large) in the sector where technical
progress occurs.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined the effect of different types of technical progress
on wages under the traditional RV model, but also with endogenous labor
supplies. In this chapter, there is an additional indirect effects through la-
bor market where elasticities of demand for labor and the endogenous labor
supply matter. On the other hand, in the case of product-specific skilled
labor augmenting, there are some additional results compared to the tradi-
tional RV model. That is, under product-specific skilled labor augmenting
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technical progress, unskilled labor wage and skilled labor wage in the other
sector reacts as well as skilled labor wage in the sector where product-specific
skilled labor augmenting technical progress occurs. In the context of whether
sector bias or factor bias matters for relative wages, as Xu (2001) points out
that, the argument between Leamer (1998) and Krugman (2000) seems to
depend on the assumptions of small open country, large open country or an
integrated world economy. However, in this framework, ESF which is related
to elasticities of factor demand, determines whether sector bias or factor bias
matters for relative wages. If ESF is sufficiently small in the 1st sector or
in other words, the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor is sufficiently
small, then skilled to unskilled wage rises in both product-specific skilled
labor augmenting and product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical
progress. This means that the technical progress occurs in the sector does
not matter whether it is skilled labor augmentation or unskilled labor aug-
mentation but results in a rise in skilled to unskilled wage, or in other words,
sector bias does matter. Hence Leamer (1998) is supported in this case in
our framework. On the contrary, if ESF is sufficiently large in the 1st sector
or elasticity of demand for unskilled labor is sufficiently large, then skilled
to unskilled wage rises in product-specific skilled labor augmenting technical
progress but declines in product-specific unskilled labor augmenting technical
progress. This means that the change in skilled to unskilled wage depends
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on whether it is skilled labor augmentation or unskilled labor augmentation
in the sector, or in other words, factor bias does matter. Hence Krugman
(2000) is supported in this case in our framework.
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Chapter 5
Summary
We have examined the issues of brain drain and international trade in part I.
In particular, we have examined the formation of the skilled labor which can
be decomposed into quality effect, quantity effect and input effect. Compared
to the standard RV model, there is an additional effect of price on wages. In
our model, when relative price rises, unskilled labor which is mobile between
sectors gains more, while the immobile factors gain less or lose more com-
pared to the standard one1. Remember that we have ambiguous effect of the
educator on human capital employed in private sector. On the other hand,
effect of educator on total human capital is unambiguously positive, which
brings an negative effect on the wage of human capital. So it is possible
1Examination of the validity of the factor price equalization theorem in Ricardo-Viner
model is also challenging, see Chong (2004b).
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that if effect of the educator on human capital employed in private sector
is negative, an increase in educator decreases the amount of human capital
employed in private sector hence decreases the output of it. In the mean-
time, it also increases the amount of total human capital which decreases
the wage of human capital. As a result, a country which allocates too much
human capital in public sector tends to be inefficient, that is, causing the
country to import high-tech good from the country where wage of human
capital is higher, hence human capital in the country which imports high-
tech good tends to migrate to the country which exports high-tech good.
This is the crucial result of our study compared to the traditional RV model
which cannot explain the brain drain issue.
We should also point out that an endogenous provision of the public ser-
vice model may be more appropriate. The study of endogenous provision
of public service model has been examined by Chong (2004a). The compa-
ration between publicly provided education service and privately provided
education service has also been examined in the paper. Further, the reason
for government to enhance a selective sector should be incorporated into the
model. What we have presented here are the basic framework for the future
research.
In part II, we have examined the effect of different types of technical
progress on wages under the traditional RV model, but also with endogenous
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labor supplies. The examination is quite simple, that is, to know whether
sector bias or factor bias matters for relative wages, we just need to know
whether both cases of product-specific skilled labor augmenting and product-
specific skilled labor augmenting change the relative wage in the same direc-
tion. If both cases change the relative wage in the same direction, we can
tell that factor bias technology change does not matter, and we can conclude
that sector bias technology change does matter for the relative wages, and
vice versa. However, the method of argument and examination in our study
is quite different from Leamer (1998) and Krugman (2000) which depend on
the assumptions of small open country, large open country or an integrated
world economy. In our study, ESF which is related to elasticities of factor
demand, determines whether sector bias or factor bias matters for relative
wages. Hence Leamer (1998) is supported if ESF is sufficiently small in the
1st sector while Krugman (2000) is supported if ESF is sufficiently large in
the 1st sector.
Using the idea of human capital formation, we have studied the relation-
ship between brain drain and international trade as well as the relationship
between technology change and wage inequality for several years. However,
there are still quite many challenges lie ahead.
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